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A Dangerous Commitment
California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1800 et seq., allows for
a continued involuntary confinement of persons committed to, but
about to be subject to release from, the California Youth Authority.
The category is "dangerousness" and the risks of injustice are unusually
great as the statutes now stand. Constitutional mandate and sound
social policy stand behind the safeguards proposed in this comment.
A juvenile has been committed by the court to the California
Youth Authority1 for involvement in an activity which, were the
matter heard as an adult proceeding, would have been a criminal
offense.2 From a life of freedom and diverse experiences, the ju-
venile is confined to an institution which is the most restrictive
and regimented of all of the possible juvenile dispositions. In-
deed, a California Court of Appeals, in In re Donna G.,3 has viewed
the potential commitment to the Youth Authority as so akin to an
adult penal commitment as to require the constitutionality test of
vagueness applicable to a statute in a criminal proceeding to apply
to a statute which might result in a commitment of a juvenile to
the Youth Authority.4
The discharge of the juvenile-his release to the life of autonomy
and opportunity which Americans cherish so deeply-is mandatory
under Section 1769 at the end of two years or on his twenty-first
birthday, whichever occurs later.5 Mandatory, -that is, unless at the
time of that mandatory discharge the juvenile, now adult, is further
detained pursuant to Sections 1800 et seq.6
1. Hereinafter cited as Youth Authority.
2. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 602. Hereinafter, all references to code
sections are references to the California Welfare and Institutions Code.
3. 6 Cal. App. 3d 890, 86 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970). Hereinafter cited as
Donna G.
4. Donna G. deemed proper the most demanding due process consider-
ations (i.e., those applicable in a criminal proceeding) while considering
whether § 777 was void for vagueness.
5. Section 1769:
Every person committed to the authority by a juvenile court shall
be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control
or when the person reaches his 21st birthday, whichever comes
later, unless an order for further detention has been made pursuant
to Article 6 (commencing with Section 1800).
6. Otherwise referred to herein as 1800 proceeding or 1800 commitment.
If our hypothetical person who had been convicted in Superior Court of a
Under an 1800 proceeding, the Youth Authority may petition the
court to further detain a person then committed to the Youth Au-
thority. Following an in camera hearing by the juvenile court, if
the individual is ordered to remain detained in the Youth Author-
ity, he may demand, within 10 days and in writing, a jury trial7
wherein the sole issue before the jurors is whether the appealing
individual: "Is . . physically dangerous to the public because of
his mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality?18 Ac-
cording to judicial construction of 1800 et seq., by the California
Supreme Court, the maximum period of time for which the individ-
ual may be detained under the 1800 proceeding is two years9 al-
though this procedure may be evoked at biennial intervals, so that
the ". . . theoretical maximum period of detention is life."'1
"Sections 1800-1803 apply only to . . . minors committed to the
Youth Authority by the juvenile court pursuant to authority of
Sections 730, 731, and 777, and to young adults committed by the
Superior Court pursuant to Sections 1730-1731.5.""l Consequently
the great majority of those committed to the Youth Authority
reached that institution only after an adjudication beyond a reason-
able doubt that they had committed an offense punishable against
criminal offense but was, at the time, under the age of 21 years, he could
have been committed to the Youth Authority pursuant to §§ 1730-1731.5. In
this event, in addition to being subject to possible further detention under
§ 1800 et seq., that person could, alternatively, have been returned to the
committing court, should he have been found by the Youth Authority
* . . to be an improper person to be retained in any [Youth Author-
ity] institution or facility, or to be so incorrigible or so incapable
of reformation ... as to render his detention detrimental to the in-
terests of the authority and other persons committed thereto....
In such case, the person may be committed to a state prison or county jail
with a maximum term of imprisonment being that "period equal to the
maximum term prescribed by law for the offense of which he was convicted
less the period during which he was under the control of the Youth Author-
ity." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1737.1 (West 1972). This "continued de-
tention" of the person involved, however, involves a determinate sentence,
whereas commitment under § 1800 et seq. theoretically does not (see text
accompanying note 10 infra).
7. Section 1801.5.
8. Id.
9. People v. Smith, 5 Cal. 3d 313, 486 P.2d 1213, 96 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1971).
Hereinafter cited as Smith. Section 1802 provides that an order for further
detention continues for five years if the person was committed by an adult
court, but only for two years if committed by the juvenile court. Smith
held that the distinction was without rational or ,compelling basis and hence
violative of equal protection. Thus commitments in either category may be
for a maximum of two years per petition.
10. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 300, 486 P.2d 1201, 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr.
1, 4 (1971). Hereinafter cited as Gary W.
11. Id. at 299-300, 486 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
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adults under the criminal law.12 In the 1800 proceeding, however, a
finding of "dangerousness" must be made by three-fourths of the
12. Theoretically, a juvenile could be committed to the California Youth
Authority resulting from an adjudication under the combined effect of §§
601 and 777. (Unless otherwise indicated, reference to Appendix for perti-
nent portions of statutes mentioned). According to Section 701, a person
described under § 601 may be brought within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court if the allegations against him are supported by proof amounting to
a preponderance of the evidence. This would indicate that presently, Youth
Authority committees subject to § 1800 et seq. may in fact have entered the
process based on a finding of only a preponderance of the evidence. The
contrast, however, between the juvenile's jurisdictional contact and that in-
dividual's continued detention under § 1800 et seq. remains striking.
Although California courts have declared that the preponderance stand-
ard is constitutionally adequate with regard to § 600 commitments (see In
re Eva S., 18 Cal. App. 3d 788, 96 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1971), dependent child)
and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), has been acknowledged as establish-
ing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as the requisite burden of proof
for § 602 commitments (In re C.D.H., 7 Cal. App. 3d 230, 86 Cal. Rptr. 565
(1970)), no California case, since In re Winship, has held that the prepon-
derance test affords adequate due process safeguards in a § 601 commit-
ment. The § 601 proceeding is readily distinguishable from a § 600 proceed-
ing. The former potentially results in the juvenile becomine a "ward" of
the court (as with § 602 proceedings) rather than a mere "dependent child".
A "600" dependent child may be placed with reputable persons of good
moral character; or some association, or society or corporation which em-
braces within its objects the purpose of caring for such minors; or a suitable
family home or private institution; or any other public agency organized to
provide care for needy or neglected children (see § 727). The "§ 601" ward
may also be committed, pursuant to § 730, to a juvenile home, ranch or for-
estry camp. And finally, under § 777, a § 601 ward may be committed to
the California Youth Authority. See In re Donna G., 6 Cal. App. 3d 890,
86 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970) as judicial recognition of the significance of such
potential commitment. Although the "601" and "602" labels may arguably
produce different stigmas, the proceeding itself and the potential or actual
commitment seem to bear substantially more weight in determining the
stigma than does the technical distinction between whether a juvenile was
found involved in an activity which if presented in adult criminal court
would constitute a crime (602) or that juvenile was found by the court to
be a person who habitually disobeys authorities, is "beyond . . . control",
an habitual truant or is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or im-
moral life (§ 601). The distinction between the § 601 and § 602 adjudica-
tion, as relating to the associated effect on the involved individual's future
social and economic future, is surely present in the eyes of those who
see form and not substance, those who view academically what they them-
selves have not experienced. So although it is true that a person subject
to the commitment under §§ 1800 et seq. may have originally been com-
mitted there resulting from an original jurisdictional contact supported by
a mere preponderance of the evidence, this is not only the exception, but
also sound social policy and constitutional mandate require that the burden
should have been beyond a reasonable doubt, as is required by Winship for
jurors for a commitment to be allowed 13 and the requisite standard
of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence.14
Close to freedom, society calls the individual back to the involun-
tary commitment of the Youth Authority. The interests at stake
are the individual's liberty versus society's declared interest in that
individual's rehabilitation from an alleged physically dangerous
condition. The normal release of the juvenile-now-adult being
jeopardized, the issue is what safeguards society owes to the in-
volved individual in order to assure that involuntary commitment
results only where a substantial and constitutionally sufficient so-
cietal interest is present. The institutional molding of character-
as distinct from societal intervention with criminally sanctionable
behavior-remains a suspect procedure in a society holding a high
regard for individuality. And even if the proceeding to accomplish
this character molding is seen as justifiable in select circumstances,
the proposed rehabilitation has been so historically fallible that the
nature of the proceeding itself should be subject to close scrutiny.
PERSPECTIVE
The 1800 proceeding operates in the midst of a system which is
generally opposed to such concerns as dangerousness, without more.
It is axiomatic that the criminal law will not convict a man on proof
of evil intent alone. A man who had been convicted of attempt
to steal a slave was freed by the Appellate Court because:
The time proposed for consummating the crime was so far distant
as to render it very doubtful whether the accused had fully re-
solved upon the commission of the act. There was ample room for
§ 602 proceedings.
Thus, it remains the case that although the highest standard was appro-
priate for the juvenile's jurisdictional contact which eventually resulted in
his original commitment to the Youth Authority, the § 1800 proceeding at-
tempts to extend that confinement beyond the otherwise mandatory release
date and into the individual's majority, based upon the lesser standard-
one historically limited to proceedings involving potential losses character-
istic of mere civil matters-the preponderance of the evidence test.
13. Section 1801.5.
14. Gary W., supra note 10, at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10,
held that the proper standard of proof in a § 1800 proceeding is that "of
a like manner as is made available" to those persons subject to involuntary
commitment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and related legislation
(Stats. 1967, ch. 1667; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5401, 6250-6825).
See, e.g., People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800(1968) and People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968)(commitment for narcotic addiction based on Section 3100 et seq., prepon-
derance of evidence sufficient); People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311
P.2d 897 (1957) (commitment for sexual psychopathy, based on § 5500 et
seq., not akin to a criminal proceeding and, therefore, not requiring the pro-
cedural safeguards of, inter alia, proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
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the locus penitentiae before making a final decision. It would be
too much to say he would not have awakened to a just sense
of the enormity of the crime and relented before the proposed time
for its perpetration arrived. Lovett v. State, 19 Tex. 174, 177
(1857) .15
Perkins states that, as to the requirement of an act in the perpe-
tration of criminally sanctionable conduct:
. . .(A) wrongful intent which has no consequences in the external
world . . . [is of no matter of special interest to the criminal law].
Ordinarily, such an intent would be known only to him who enter-
tained it, but if he freely admits that such a thought was once in his
mind, no crime has been established. There has been no "social
harm". Few are so upright as to be able to exclude any criminal
thought from entering the mind under any and all circumstances.
The average law abiding citizen is not one who never has a crim-
inal intent, but one who never permits such a thought to rule his
conduct. (Emphasis supplied).16
But the courts are quick to advise all persons concerned that the
1800 proceeding results not in a "conviction" nor an "imprisonment"
for evil thoughts and possible future misconduct, but rather results
only in a "medical" determination of a "sociopathic" condition of
"physical dangerousness" and a "civil" commitment for rehabilita-
tive purposes only, devoid of the stigma of a criminal conviction. 17
These contentions may be accurate'" at least to the extent that un-
der some circumstances, with certain strict procedural safeguards,
persons could be subjected to involuntary civil commitment argu-
ably without infringement on constitutional guarantees of due proc-
ess of law. However, the 1800 proceeding today is of such a charac-
ter as to not embody the requisite strict procedural guarantees and
thereby violates the constitutional rights of the involved individual
through the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 13 of the Cali-
15. Waite, Crime Prevention and Judicial Casuistry, 5 HAST. L.J. 169, 172
(1954).
16. R. Perkins, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 546 (2d ed. 1969); see also,
B. Witkin, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 66, 93, 106 (1964).
17. See Gary W., supra note 10, at 301-02, 486 P.2d at 1205-06, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 5-6. Physical dangerousness, if a category giving rise to penal con-
sequences, would be violative, under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (punishment for status), of the constitutional proscription against
cruel and unusual punishments. Gary W., at 301, 486 P.2d at 1205, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 5.
18. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
fornia Constitution.'"
Although all penal institutions give lip-service to having a pri-
mary objective of rehabilitation of their inmates, it would certainly
be an unwise policy to abandon, on the theory that the defendant
was merely to undergo medical rehabilitation, the many constitu-
tional principles which have, over the years, been built up as safe-
guards against the deprivation of liberty of innocent persons caught
in the criminal process. 20  Substance, not form, is of paramount
importance in determining the requirements of due process in any
particular case.
The purpose of due process of law is to give protection against
any arbitrary interference with rights21 and may be generally
described as requiring an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature
of the case, in which a person has an opportunity to defend, enforce
and protect his rights as a free individual in society.2 2 According
to the importance of the interests at stake then, due process guaran-
tees will decide whether a jury is to be required, whether a light
or strict burden of proof is to apply, whether a unanimous or 3/4
jury verdict is to be required, what specificity of standards is to
be required in guiding judge and jury in their determinations, and
what are to constitute the applicable rules of evidence. 23
The propriety of any proceeding dealing solely with dangerous-
ness is not beyond question. In spite of any professed commitment
to treatment being tied to the 1800 commitment, the fact remains
that the individual will be returned to the Youth Authority, the
very place where he had already received, for a minimum of two
19. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, Section 1:
No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
CAL. CONST. Art. 1, Section 13:
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law ....20. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) ('Brennan, J., concurring
opinion).
21. See Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co., 42 Cal. App. 674, 184 P. 431
(1919).
22. Los Angeles v. Oliver, 102 Cal. App. 299, 283 P. 298 (1929).
23. Gary W., supra note 10, held, inter alia, that in all adult commitment
cases the person against whom the proceedings are brought is entitled to
the same discovery procedures as are allowed adults in criminal cases and
juveniles.
Although full discovery rights available in a civil action are not available
to a minor in juvenile court, he is entitled, on a proper showing, to all of
the discovery procedures to which a criminal defendant is entitled. This
includes admissions the minor may have made to the authorities and, for
impeachment purposes, statements of witnesses that the prosecution intends
to call at the hearing. Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26,
91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970). Also in adult commitment proceedings, upon a
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years, admittedly ineffective treatment.24 These proceedings are by
their nature and in practice proceedings delving into sociopathic
tendencies-concepts no more understood by society than appreci-
ated by it 25 -and therefore ripe for ethnocentric abuse. The threat
of harrassment and unjust results is at a height where not even
an inchoate form of a crime is required to bring a party before
the court. In any event, the prediction of this dangerousness is
at best a skill limited to the practiced clinical psychologist or psy-
chiatrist,26 and any jury determination of dangerousness for the
purposes of treatment should therefore be closely tied to the expert
witnesses' testimony.
But even assuming that the 1800 proceeding serves a worthy
societal interest in the abstract, it stands as a faulty mechanism
for its task. The "dangerousness" standard is excessively vague and
is overbroad and the preponderance of evidence standard belies the
tremendous gravity of the interests at stake in the 1800 proceeding.
LACK OF STANDARDS
The United States Supreme Court, in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,27
considered a statute which allowed a jury to impose court costs
on a criminal defendant who had been acquitted from the charge.
Although the state analogized the process to the civil practice of
granting compensation to a litigant for expenses, the court stated
that whatever the label given to the purported jury prerogative
as to imposition of costs, the process must stand up to the test
for procedural due process of law. And even establishing "mis-
conduct" by the defendant therein to serve as the fixed standard
by which the jury was to decide what conduct would and would
not allow such an imposition of costs, such a process;
still falls short of the kind of legal standard due process requires
showing of relevance and necessity the court may authorize any discovery
procedures available in a civil case, or issue an out-of-county subpoena.
Gary W., supra note 10, at 310, 478 P.2d at 1212, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
24. See note 88 infra, and accompanying text.
25. See Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Danger-
ous Criminals: Perspectives and Problems, 56 VA. L.R. 602, 613-16, 618-21
(1970).
26. S. Halleck, M.D., PsYcHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME, 1971, at
314-18.
27. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
• . . It would be difficult if not impossible for a person to prepare a
defense against such general abstract charges as "misconduct" or
"reprehensible conduct."28
Physical dangerousness, it is submitted, similarly is excessively
vague, preventing a defendant from preparing a defense, notwith-
standing the "civil" label of the proceeding.
Moreover, since the 1800 proceeding results in confinement, albeit
for treatment, in the Youth Authority-the most restrictive of all
of the facilities in California for youthful offenders-whether
"physically dangerous" affords sufficient detail is to be determined
by a demanding test of due process. The court, in In re Donna
G.,29 has deemed proper the most demanding due process considera-
tions in a proceeding with potential consequences of the nature of
an 1800 proceeding. Considering whether Section 777 was void for
vagueness, the court declared that in light of In re Winship,30 and
In re Gault3 and "[s]ince the possible result of a . . . proceeding
under Section 777 is that of a commitment to the Youth Authority
. . . the test of vagueness applicable to a criminal proceeding must
be applied. '32
The potential consequences of the 1800 proceeding are indeed
grave for the individual against whom the proceeding is brought-
unexpected extended commitment in a confining institution. As
in In re Gault,
His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regi-
mented routine and institutional hours ... ." Instead of ... [fam-
ily and friends], his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from
waywardness to rape and homicide. 38
In In re Gary W., 34 the California Supreme Court gave recogni-
tion to the importance of the interests at stake in the 1800 proceed-
ing. The Gary W. court held that due process of law requires that
a jury trial accompany an 1800 commitment. Nothwithstanding the
civil label of the 1800 proceeding,
To the person who is threatened with involuntary confinement,
these considerations [the interests at stake and the need for a jury
trial safeguard] are equally important whether the threat of con-
finement originates in a civil action or a criminal prosecution.
(Emphasis supplied.) 8 5
28. Id., at 404; accord, Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
29. Donna G., supra note 3.
30. See supra note 12.
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. Donna G., supra note 3, at 894, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
33. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
34. Supra note 10.
35. Id., at 307, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9; see Smith, supra note
[VOL. 2: 116, 1974] A Dangerous Commitment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
And although the Gary W. holding is limited to requiring that
the jury trial be afforded an 1800 potential committee, the force
and effect of the decision is to underline the substantial losses pos-
sible should a commitment be in fact without proper justification.
Here an inquiry into "physically dangerous" smacks of a search for
a criminal mentality. Without necessary reference to any recent
and aggressive overt acts, the jury is allowed to decide the fate
of an individual tagged by Youth Authority officials as dangerous.
The absence of substantive standards has, as recognized since the
days of the Star Chambers,
frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, [and judgments]
but in arbitrariness .... It is ... [the] instruments of due process
which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the con-
frontation of opposing versions and conflicting data.36
Certainly it is a slight burden on the state to have to proceed in
the 1800 hearing under more exacting a standard than one of the
nature as was condemned in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, supra37-i.e.,
more exacting than mere "physically dangerous."
The 1800 proceeding deals not with conduct or public offenses
which the ward has exhibited or committed in the past (for which
he might be prosecuted under normal criminal proceedings), but
rather seeks to predict, through the ordinary experience of the
"man off the street"-the juror-whether that ward will be "phys-
ically dangerous" if released.38 No standards are delineated for the
jury for assistance in their task. The court is not required by law
to advise the jurors that a pre-condition to a finding of "dangerous"
shall be that they first find, for example, that the ward has "com-
mitted recent overt acts of physical aggression upon the person of
another and has stated that he intends to engage in similar behavior
if allowed. . . free," or that "doctors predict that he will continue
.. . to commit [said overt acts of physical aggression] . . . if al-
lowed . ..free," or that "his behavior reflects a very substantial
risk of physical harm to his own person as manifested by recent
9, at 317, 486 P.2d at 1216, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 16, where the court noted that
although their decision in Gary W., supra note 10, spoke in terms of an
"equal protection" analysis, the holding was based also on Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirements.
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 and 21 (1967).
37. Supra note 27.
38. See note 47 infra.
attempt or attempts of suicide or serious bodily harm," or'that "his
behavior reflects a very substantial risk of physical harm to his
own person as manifested by personal threats of suicide or serious
bodily harm," or even that the ward is dangerous to property "as
he has committed acts destructive of the property of others and
doctors predict that he will do so in the future. '30  No such stand-
ards are forwarded for the jury's, and the proposed committee's,
benefit, but rather, the question is simply put to the jury: "Is the
person physically dangerous to the public because of his mental or
physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality? '40
California courts have declared the concept of "dangerous" to be
not so vague as to be constitutionally infirm therefor.4 1  "Phys-
ically dangerous" is susceptible to "reasonable definition, and may
readily be applied in specific factual situations," declares one
court.42 A statute is void for vagueness, however, if it "either for-
bids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
. . ."43 And a statute is void for overbreadth if it offends the con-
stitutional principle that "a governmental purpose to control or pre-
vent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. '44
39. Special Project, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory
and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 102-3 (1971); see also, CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 5300, 5260, 5008(h) (West 1972). But see, Minnesota v.
Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1940), where the court declared that for
a statute regarding the "sexual psychopath" to impose upon the "patient"
an involuntary civil commitment, it must, to avoid constitutional infirmity
through excessive vagueness or indefiniteness, require,
"proof of a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters" on a
part of the person against whom a proceeding under the statute isdirected, which has shown "an utter lack of power to control their
sexual impulses," and hence that they "are likely to attack or oth-
erwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire."
Hence, it is likely that a variation of this standard is constitutionally re-
quired with regard to § 1800 proceedings, albeit has not as yet been so ruled
by California courts. Cf. People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 466, 311 P.2d
897, 901 (1957), where the court cites Minnesota, supra, in defining "sexual
psychopath" for purposes of rendering constitutional CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6300 et seq. (West 1972).
40. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1801.5 (West 1972).
41. In re Cavanaugh, 234 Cal. App. 2d 316, 44 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1965); In
re J.F., 268 Cal. App. 2d 761, 74 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1969).
42. In re Cavanaugh, supra note 41, at 323, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
43. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
44. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967); see also, In re Berry,
68 Cal. 2d 137, 156, n.15, 436 P.2d 273, 286, n.15, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 286, n.15
(1968).
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Physical dangerousness is far from a concrete concept. 45 Many
questions, not immediately apparent, arise when one seeks to apply
that concept to fact situations. What extent of force is seen as
likely emanating from the individual? For what purposes might
this latent aggression assert itself-would a slightly over-zealous
assertion of right of way in a hallway justify commitment? To
what standard is the individual involved to be compared-a dock
worker, farmer, athlete, or bookkeeper? The question quickly be-
comes: Dangerous to whom? To what extent? For what reasons?
And relative to what standard?46
45. Special Project, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory
and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 96-117 (1971). Civil commitment
based upon "dangerousness" was found, in this extensive survey, to be
fraught with uncertainties in meaning and statewide implementation: ".
(T) he psychiatrist is not competent to perform such a predictive task [cita-
tion];" (at 96). Quoting the Subcommittee on Mental Health Services,
California Legislative Assembly Interim Committee on Ways and Means,
the Dilemma of Mental Commitments in California 143 (1965), the Arizona
survey affirmed that, "with regard to potentially dangerous persons, the
evidence available indicates that there are no tests that can predict an indi-
vidual's capacity for dangerous behavior;" (at 97). Most such commitments
are made on a "better safe than sorry" theory; (at 98). Often, commitments
are made not on an evaluation of dangerousness, as called for by statute,
but rather, "as a problem solving device," the recommendation for commit-
ment being, "candidly based on . . . [testifying doctors'] opinion [sic] of
the patient's need for psychiatric evaluation;" (at 100). Commitment was
sometimes seen as a way of, "purging the community of undesirables,"
thereby maintaining the "quality of the community;" (at 101). And finally,
the report cited,
(P)rofessors Livermore, Malmquist and Meehl . . . [in] what has
become the classic statistical paradigm revealing the risk involved
in commitment by prediction of dangerousness. "Assume that one
person out of a thousand will kill. Assume also that an exception-
ally accurate test is created which differentiates with ninety-five
percent effectiveness those who will kill from those who will not.
If 100,000 people were tested, out of the 100 who would kill, 95
would be isolated. Unfortunately, out of the 99,900 who would not
kill, 4,995 people would also be isolated as potential killers. In
these circumstances, it is clear that we could not justify incarcerat-
ing all 5,090 people. If, in the criminal law, it is better that ten
guilty men go free than that one innocent man suffer, how can we
say in the civil commitment area that it is better that fifty-four
harmless people be incarcerated lest one dangerous man be free?"
The point is that the error cuts both ways so that while five
of the one hundred (5 percent) who will kill are not identified, 5
percent of the remaining 99,900 individuals who will not kill will
be erroneously identified as predictable killers; (at 99). (Hereinaf-
ter cited as 13 ARiz. L. REV.).
46. No less a figure than Sigmund Freud himself warned of the inevit-
able connection between the personal attitudes of psychiatric examiners and
their consequent appraisals of examinees:
Illusions need not necessarily be false-that is to say, unrealiza-
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Where no overt acts amounting to a crime have been committed 47
it would seem that the people's burden of assuring certainty, by
affording an unusually narrow and definitive statutory standard
to the findings of fact, should be greater, not less, than in the
normal criminal tests for procedural due process as quoted above.48
The 1800 proceeding is distinguishable from other civil commit-
ments in California since, as distinct from a narcotics addiction
commitment,49 gravely disabled persons commitment 0 or a sexual
psychopath commitment 5' the 1800 commitment is based neither
on a purely medical diagnosis,5 2 in its traditional sense, nor neces-
sarily on past acts, as must surely be the case, in practice, with
sexual psychopath commitments.5 3
Again, there may be some individuals who could very well use
treatment for their anti-social behavioral patterns, and are of such
a disposition that the public-at-large may be justifiably relieved to
see them removed from open society. And, of course, regardless
ble or in contradiction to reality. For instance, a middle-class girl
may have the illusion that a prince will come and marry her. This
is possible; and a few such cases have occurred. That the Messiah
will come and found a golden age is much less likely. Whether one
classifies this belief as an illusion or as something analogous to a
delusion will depend on one's personal attitude.
S. FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 49 (1964). (G. Swan, A New Emanci-
pation: Toward an End to Involuntary Civil Commitments, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 1334 (1973)).
47. As stated in In re J.F., 268 Cal. App. 2d 761, 769, 74 Cal. Rptr. 464,
469 (1969) with regard to a sexual psychopath commitment (a proceeding,
according to the California Supreme Court, akin to a § 1800 proceeding (see,
Gary W., supra note 10, at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10 (1971))),
a commitment, continued beyond the age of majority, is permitted
by statute not because of what the minor has done in the past, but
by reason of what "because of his mental or physical deficiency,
disorder or abnormality," he is likely to do in the future.
48. See supra, text accompanying notes 43 and 44.
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CorE § 3100 et seq. (West 1972).
50. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 et seq. (West 1972).
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6300 et seq. (West 1972).
52. The court, in In re J.F., supra note 41, at 771, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 471,
remarked in response to an argument that a strict standard of beyond a rea-
sonable doubt should be required in a narcotics addiction commitment, that,
narcotic commitment proceedings ... [are] "civil" "non-punitive"
and "remedial" . . . . It must be remembered that'in a narcotic(s)
commitment case the jury is in reality asked to confirm what is es-
sentially a medical diagnosis. (Emphasis supplied).
Although this statement was not directed towards the problem of the speci-
ficity or over-inclusiveness of the concept of "physically dangerous" and the
requisite imminency and gravity thereof, the message remains that much
of the flexibility which is allowed in, for example, the narcotic addiction
commitment, is due to the medical certainty which may accompany that
commitment. We have no similar medical assurance in § 1800 proceedings.
53. But see, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6302 subd. (a) (West 1972) pro-
viding that a conviction of any offense, whether or not a sex offense, may
lead to certification to the Superior Court for proceedings under § 6300 et
seq.
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of the specificity and narrowness of a statutory guideline, if that
guideline is not adhered to, but rather cited only summarily and
symbolically, any abusive proclivities which originally attended the
statutory proceeding will continue. And even diligent adherence
to such a carefully phrased yardstick will not eliminate mistakes
from being made. But to safeguard the nonconformist, creative sec-
tor of our society, we must hold out, as required by due process
of law, a standard which most nearly as possible focuses in on the
"physically dangerous" person which the Legislature intended, and
the State and Federal constitutions permit, to be involuntarily con-
fined for treatment. Accordingly, the following standard is pre-
sented:
No person shall be involuntarily committed under this chapter un-
less and until he is found by a jury to present an imminent threat
of grave physical danger to society; such a finding, moreover, shall
not be made unless and until he is found by a jury to recently,
without reasonable provocation, have inflicted or attempted to in-
flict serious physical harm or substantial damage upon the person
or property of another.54
The recent overt acts as referred to in the above standard would
amount to criminal offenses. While it is certainly tenable that
criminally sanctionable behavior should not be required to be
proved as a precondition, for example, for a civil commitment for
insanity, the same is not so readily apparent with regard to the
1800 proceeding. Dangerousness is certainly not as readily defin-
able as insanity, nor is success in treatment as well established as
with insanity. If society's purpose in the 1800 commitment is, in
reality, treatment for the physically dangerous person, then surely
the Legislature should have no serious objections to requiring, as
a precondition to an 1800 proceeding petition, a criminal conviction
on the overt acts on which the 1800 commitment is to be based.
And the maximum term of incarceration, for treatment or other-
wise, should accordingly be a period equal to the maximum term
prescribed by law for the offense of which he was convicted and
upon which his civil commitment was based. 55
54. The substance of this standard was originally forwarded in, Hear-
ings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcommit-
tee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judicary, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 393 (1970), and quoted in part in 13 ARIz. L. REV.,
supra note 45, at 115.
55. As an example of this time limit approach, see CAL. WELP. & INST.
CODE §§ 1780-1783.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Sufficiently elaborate standards is but one of the safeguards in-
volved in the concept of procedural due process. The opposition's
burden of proof of course may be determinative of the outcome
of any particular hearing or litigation. The preponderance of evi-
dence standard, presently applicable in the 1800 proceeding, has
long been associated with civil, non-criminal matters. As the
potential loss to the defending party becomes greater, greater
caution in the decision-making process which may result in such
loss requires an increasingly more strict burden of proof. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, however, has declined to accept the conten-
tion that the standard of proof in an 1800 proceeding need be any
more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.56 That decision
is contrary to federal constitutional mandate and invites loss of
liberty by persons not rightfully subject to involuntary confine-
ment for treatment.
The 1800 proceeding deals with inherently inflammatory evidence
and consequently carries with it an internal source of abuse-fail-
ure of a jury to critically evaluate the evidence presented. Pro-
fessor Kaplan of Stanford University has written57 of the utilities
attached to the two possible factual outcomes in civil and criminal
cases-guilt and innocence. The professor postulates generally that
a finding of fact should be based on a standard of proof commensu-
rate with the social utility of convicting a guilty man versus the
social disutility of convicting an innocent man. As the disutility
of a wrongful conviction increases so should the standard of proof
become more strict. As the likelihood of injustice increases, so
should the system adjust itself procedurally to provide additional
internal safeguards against the threatening injustice.
Professor Kaplan is arguing that the standards of proof should
be adjusted from within the minds of the jurors. This can be ac-
complished, he argues, by communicating to the jurors, for example,
the severity of the sentence (i.e., the interests at stake) upon a
finding of "guilty." In illustration, if the potential consequence for
a conviction for crime "X" is six months in jail and the potential
consequence of a conviction for crime "Y" is six months in jail plus
registration as a "sex offender"--wherever he may travel!-the dis-
utilities of wrongful convictions being different, this difference, if
communicated to the jurors, would assist them in their mental
56. Gary W., supra note 10. See also, note 73, infra.
57. J. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN.
L. REv. 1065 (1968).
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formulation of the standard for the requisite probability for a find-
ing of fact adverse to the defending party.
The professor's argument is especially relevant here as he also
points out the limitations of his proposal. Professor Kaplan is care-
ful to point out that in the assessment of what to communicate
to the trier of fact as to the utilities involved, the likelihood of
abuse of the communicated information, by the trier of the fact
is an important consideration. Character testimony, as opposed to
sentence severity, is seen to hold obvious deleterious potentialities
if used by the fact finder in formulating his mental, requisite prob-
ability standard. Evidence as to earlier convictions and propensity
to commit crimes, although ostensibly a valid factor in the deter-
mination of what disutilities exist in a finding of innocence of an
in fact guilty man, is actually more prejudicial to public interest
than of probative value. For these factors to enter into the stand-
ard of requisite proof formulation would be to invite a condition
abhorrent to our system of justice. "Obviously," Professor Kaplan
writes,
in a system of justice that regards it as crucial that the defendant
be found guilty only of the crime specifically charged, we cannot
permit a mistaken factual judgment to be made either on the
theory that even if the defendant did not commit the crime charged
he probably committed others, or on the theory that since the de-
fendant has been convicted several times before it is not very im-
portant to him or society that he is convicted one more time.58
Evidence of earlier convictions, general relationships with others,
unusual habits, and general propensity to commit crimes might
create in the minds of jurors privy to this information a feeling
that because of the defending party's disfavorable background, not
only would the disutility of finding him innocent, if he was in truth
guilty, be unusually great, but the disutility of finding him guilty,
if he were in (truth innocent in this particular incident, would be
of lesser consequence than in the "normal" case. The American
tradition embodies at its essence the principal of a government of
laws not of men. Surely, as the professor speculates, the above
situation would pervert this basic tenet.
The logic of the Kaplan argument may be extended to this anal-
ysis. The 1800 proceeding, of course, deals with a matter where
58. Id., at 1074.
the precise issue at hand is, in fact, the defending party's propensity
to commit anti-social, "physically dangerous" acts. The point is
striking, therefore, that upon introduction of evidence to the fact
finder of the defending party's character, past associations and past
conduct (including prior contacts with the law), that fact finder
is clearly subject to precisely the same pitfall as would be true
if similar evidence were admissible during a criminal trial! That
is, upon hearing evidence on social behavior and past conduct of
the defending party, the fact finder will inevitably and predictably
lower, in practice, whatever standard of proof is given to him. The
officially promulgated quantum of requisite proof will be made to
conform to the juror's own assessment, subconscious or otherwise,
of the utilities of a finding of "physically dangerous" of even an
innocent man. And the utilities will tip towards such a finding
where the potential for subsequent grievous malfeasance upon re-
lease of the defending party appears relatively high, given the na-
ture of the proceeding and thrust of the evidence admitted.
Where inflammatory evidence of character and past acts is ad-
mitted for purposes of a factual determination of a defendant's per-
sonal involvement in certain alleged conduct, the fact finder, in a
criminal trial, might certainly run in the face of the court's adamant
requirement that a defendant be proved involved beyond a reason-
able doubt and be found guilty only of the crime charged. So too,
with the admission of similar evidence in an 1800 proceeding, might
the fact finder adjust, personally, the proof standard to which the
court has admonished conscientious adherence, so as to conform to
his perception of the societal utilities at stake. The process of re-
moving "physically dangerous" persons from open society may
necessarily be continued but since we are limited by the nature
of the proceeding from removing the inflammatory-evidence source
of potential abuse of the fact finder's role in the 1800 proceeding,
then the only remaining solution to assuring that defending party
due process of law is to raise the standard of proof, in anticipation
of this foreseeable abuse!5 9
59. In Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 and 159 (1943)
the Court, in requiring "clear and convincing" evidence, rather than a mere
preponderance, as the quantum of evidence in a denaturalization proceeding
stated that this higher burden of proof was required where the right at stake(conferred citizenship) is "precious and when ... conferred by solemn ad-judication .... Were the law otherwise, valuable rights would rest upon
a slender reed. . . ." Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285(1966), extended the Schneiderman logic to deportation hearings, also re-
quiring a burden of establishing the grounds for deportation by "clear and
convincing" evidence.
To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution.
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The preponderance of the evidence quantum of proof, presently
deemed applicable in 1800 proceedings, has the dispositive signifi-
cance of allowing room for reasonable doubt in any determination
thereunder. Furthermore, "the preponderance test is susceptible
to the misinterpretation that it calls on the trier of fact merely
to perform an abstract weighing of the evidence in order to deter-
mine which side has produced the greater quantum, without regard
to its effect in convincing his mind of the truth of the proposition
asserted [citation] ."60
[Citation]. But it does not syllogistically follow that a person canbe banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof than
applies in a negligence case. This Court has not closed its eyes to
the drastic deprivation that may follow when a resident ... is
compelled. . . to go to a foreign land ...
In Woodby, one of the defendant-petitioners was being deported for carry-
ing on prostitution. 8 U.S.C. § 1251, generally, is a statute enabling the de-
portation of aliens from the United States on certain specified grounds. One
purpose of the section was to provide for deportation of aliens found to ex-
hibit through the commission, even if prior to entry into the United States,
of offenses involving moral turpitude. It was designed to end hospitality
to aliens possessing a criminal tendency (Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d
663 (9th Cir. 1947), reversed on other grounds, 333 U.S. 6 (1947)). Thus,
the public interests at stake in § 1251 deportation cases and § 1800 proceed-
ings are substantially similar-criminal tendency and tendency towards
physical dangerousness, respectively. And the interests of the individual,
as well, are comparable. With § 1251 deportations, the defending party
stands to lose his residence and is uprooted against his will (although once
gone from the country, free to travel as he is able, according to the laws
and customs of his host sovereign nation). The § 1800 proceeding defend-
ing party is likewise uprooted from free movement in this society, restricted
from his personal residence and retained in an institution where he is not
free to roam. The person against whom a § 1800 proceeding is levied, al-
though not deprived of a country, is substantially deprived of his liberty
and reaps as a benefit to himself, only what rehabilitation may be afforded
him through our state agencies (see note 90 infra and accompanying text).
The standard of proof required for a § 1800 commitment should, on the au-
thority of Schneiderman and Woodby, supra, be at minimum proof of a
"clear and convincing" nature. What the § 1800 proceeding defendant loses
relative to the deported alien, through restrictions on freedom of movement,
he certainly does not gain from his presence in his home-country without
such freedoms, nor by the extension of the admittedly ineffective, to that
point, treatment afforded him by the Youth Authority.
60. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970). See, e.g., J. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3d Ed. 1940), V. 9, Section 2498, at 327:
What those who have laid down the principle that "preponderance"
of evidence will justify and require a decision conformable with it,
have failed to realize, is that perception of the preponderance of
evidence is quite consistent with want of belief. Of two pieces of
very weak evidence, one may preponderate .... It would be
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A California court declared that, "the controlling factor [in
allowing lesser procedural safeguards] . . . lies in the specific
declaration of policy of the legislature that persons addicted to nar-
cotics shall be treated civilly and nonpunitively for their own pro-
tection." 61 The "for their own good" rationale for diminishing the
procedural safeguards which are deemed to be constitutionally
necessary in involuntary civil commitments extends into 1800 pro-
ceedings as well,62 notwithstanding the fact that physical danger-
ousness is a concept of a basically non-"medical" variety.63
The United States Supreme Court has never been much im-
pressed with the significance of labels of "civil,"6 4 and in In re Win-
ship6" it once again cast suspicion on the widespread use of the term.
In Winship, a 12 year-old boy was charged under juvenile law with
acts which if done by an adult would constitute larceny. The sole
question on this appeal was whether proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was among the "essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment"6 6 required during an adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed
by an adult.
Repeatedly, the Court in Winship emphasized and affirmed that
the right of a criminally accused to conviction only under proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is "basic in our law," "historically
grounded," of "vital importance," "a prime instrument for reducing
risk of convictions resting on factual error," "provides concrete sub-
stance for the presumption of innocence" and protects the defend-
ant not only from unjust loss of liberty but also from unjust stigma
of a criminal conviction. 7
But in Winship the Court was not dealing with the normal adult
criminal prosecution, but rather with a proceeding labelled "civil."68
The proceeding was labelled by the Appellate Court as being de-
signed "not to punish, but to save the child," as not being a "convic-
fatuous to affirm that every man ought to believe, even faintly,
everything the evidence for which is, in his opinion, stronger than
the evidence against it. (Citation).
61. People v. Lipscomb, 263 Cal. App. 2d 59, 67, 69 Cal. Rptr. 127, 131
(1968).
62. See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 234 Cal. App. 2d 316, 44 Cal, Rptr. 422
(1965); In re J.F., 268 Cal. App. 2d 761, 74 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1969).
63. See, supra note 48, and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17, 49-50 (1966); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
554 (1966).
65. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
66. Id., at 359.
67. Id., at 362 and 363.
68. Id., at 365.
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tion," and therefore not in constitutional need of the strict standard
of proof required in matters of penal consequence. 69 "Civil labels
and good intentions. . ," however, were exposed by the Supreme
Court to "... not themselves obviate the need for criminal due
process safeguards in juvenile courts....
Summarizing the Court's holding, Justice Harlan, in a concurring
opinion in Winship noted that, "while the consequences (of a crim-
inal proceeding) are not identical to those in a juvenile case, the
differences will not support a distinction in the standard of proof. ' 71
The interests at stake in young Winship's involvement in the pro-
ceedings were two-fold:
First, and of paramount importance, a factual error here, as in a
criminal case, exposes the accused to a complete loss of his personal
liberty through a state imposed confinement away from his home,
family and friends. And, second, a delinquency determination, to
some extent at least, stigmatizes a youth in that it is by definition
bottomed on a finding that the accused committed a crime. (Em-
phasis supplied).72
As we shall see, the same, if not more weighty, interests are fully
present and at stake in an 1800 proceeding.
The California Supreme Court has dealt with the problem of
what procedural due process requires of the 1800 proceeding. In
In re Gary W., the apparent issue78 was whether the aim, method
69. Id., at 365.
70. Id., at 365-66.
71. Id., at 373-74 (concurring opinion).
72. Id., at 374 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.). The Opinion of the Court
noted, additionally, that the imposition of a stricter standard of proof in this
nature of juvenile proceeding will have no adverse effect on the informality,
flexibility or speed of the hearing at which the fact finding will take place.
(Id., at 366).
73. I say "apparent" because, although Gary W. speaks of argument fo-
cused on allegations of cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection and
due process as they relate to a right to a jury trial, at no time does the
reader become aware that the case also stands for the proposition that a
strict standard of proof is not required, according to the opinion, by due
process considerations in a § 1800 proceeding. The court does hold quite
plainly though that,
Appellant is entitled to a jury trial [presumably, one would believe
at first glance, as distinct from a non-jury trial] in like manner as
is made available to ... [other civil commitment procedures of the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, supra note 14] (Gary W., supra note
10, at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10).
It is only when we refer to the companion case of Smith (supra note 7)
and effect of the 1800 proceeding was such that a jury trial must
be made available to the accused for a commitment to not be viola-
tive of due process and equal protection of the laws under the
United States and California constitutions. 74  On the question of
equal protection, the court notes that a right to trial by jury is,
in a proceeding of the nature of an 1800 proceeding, a fundamental
right 75 and that the denial thereof, to the accused party, must there-
fore be supported by a compelling state interest.76  Indeed, the
court adopted a view of the interests at stake in an 1800 proceeding
consonant with that of the California Legislature. The court
wrote:
In extending the right to trial by jury to other classes of persons
subject to civil commitment proceedings, the California Legislature
has recognized that the interests involved . . . are no less funda-
mental than those in criminal proceedings and that liberty is no
less precious because forfeited in a civil proceeding than when
taken as a consequence of a criminal conviction .... (T)he right
to jury trial is a requirement of due process of law .. (Empha-
sis added). 77
that it becomes ascertained that in Gary W., the court,
also decided that the burden of proof in . . . [1800] proceedings
should be that of other civil commitments [Smith, supra note 9,
at 316, 489 P.2d at 1215, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 15; emphasis added].
The issue of requisite quantum of proof hardly received its just publication
and discussion, especially in light of the earlier appellate level holding that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required as a matter of due process,
given that the § 1800 proceeding is "'penal in nature and effect.'" (People
v. Smith, 11 Cal. App. 3d 513, 521, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1970)).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Section 1; CAL. CONST. Art. 1, Sections 11,
13 and 21. Petitioner therein also advanced argument that § 1800 proceed-
ings were violative of the principle against cruel and unusual punishment
(U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. Art. 1, Section 6), but this was dis-
mis.sed on the basis that a § 1800 commitment does not amount to "punish-
ment" (Gary W., supra note 10, at 301, 486 P.2d at 1201-04, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 5).
75. Gary W., supra note 10, at 306, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9:
A variety of interests have been held to be so 'fundamental' as to
impose ... on the state [the burden of establishing both that the
state has a compelling interest which justifies the law and that the
distinction is necessary to further that purpose]. Voting . . . pro-
creation . . . inter-state travel . . . and education [are examples].
... The right to a jury trial in an action which may lead to the
involuntary confinement of the defendant, even if such confinement
is for the purpose of treatment, is no less fundamental. (Emphasis
added).
76. See In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 110-11, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 255, 261 (1970).
77. Gary W., supra note 10, at 307, 486 P.2d at 1209-10, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
9-10. This reference to Legislative "recognition" of the fundamental status
of the rights involved could not be intended by the court to diminish the
inherently fundamental nature of the jury trial in these proceedings; rather,
the reference is intended apparently as evidentiary of the heightened status
of right to jury trial here. Certainly, the Legislature cannot establish a
right as being "fundamental", under the United States Constitution (or state
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Hence, the interests at stake are indeed fundamental, even in light
of the proposed rehabilitation.7 8
Confronted with the argument that 1800 proceedings were a "con-
tinuation of juvenile proceedings" 79 and that therefore no right to
a jury trial exists, 0 the Gary W. court declared that, quite to the
contrary, the 1800 proceeding applies ". . . only to adults. It is in
no way a juvenile proceeding, nor is it an extension of a prior
juvenile court proceeding." 8' By holding the right to a jury trial
to adhere in 1800 proceedings, the court in Gary W. rejected the
applicability of the rationale of the decision in the United States
Supreme Court case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.8 2  McKeiver
held that due process and equal protection do not require a jury
trial in juvenile proceedings. The rationale of McKeiver is prima-
rily that because of the rehabilitative purpose and force of civil
commitment procedures, the jury would stand not as a guardian
of liberty, but as an impediment to the flexibility required to
implement such rehabilitative, civil commitment hearings.8 3 By re-
constitution) by indirect means (e.g., by granting a right to other similar
activities and proceedings) where such right would not otherwise be deemed
to be
. . . some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and consci-
ence of our people as to be ranked as fundamental [Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)1.
See, e.g., Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the court
denied that age was a suspect classification in employment standards not-
withstanding the existence of several federal enactments expressing such a
general policy.
78. "[C]onfinement pursuant to Sections 1800-1803 shall be only for the
purpose of treatment." (Gary W., supra note 10, at 301, 486 P.2d at 1205,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 5). Note also, the need for strong procedural safeguards
seems especially great when one remembers that,
in most cases the jurisdictional link [between the accused and the
1800 proceeding) is the commitment for a criminal [sic] offense
for which a jury trial was . . . denied [People v. Smith, 11 Cal.
App. 3d 515, 520, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885, (1970), reversed and re-
manded, Smith, supra note 9].
79. Gary W., supra note 10, at 305, 486 P.2d at 1208, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
80. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
81. Gary W., supra note 10, at 305, 486 P.2d at 1208, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
82. Supra note 80.
83. A part of the rationale for the McKeiver decision is the adverse ef-
fect-arguably unique to juveniles-upon the juvenile's respect for the sys-
tem of justice arising from the "clamor" of the courtroom, should a jury
be impanelled for the proceeding. But note that the court also based its
decision on (1) the fact that a jury trial would not strengthen the factfind-
ing process, but rather might prejudice the "unique manner" in which the
juvenile court is able to deal with their rehabilitative tasks; (2) the fact
that a jury might act as an impediment to the "rehabilitative goals" of the
137
jecting the applicability of the McKeiver rationale to the 1800 pro-
ceeding, Gary W. firmly established that the interests to be pro-
tected when threatening the liberty of an adult are greater than
the interests involved in a proceeding which affects juveniles. If
the foregoing were not the case, the McKeiver rule would certainly
be a forceful argument against the constitutional necessity of a jury
trial in the civil, 1800 proceeding. That adults are entitled to
greater safeguards than minors, moreover, seems well established
in American jurisprudence.8 4
It should be remembered that one of the basic underlying justi-
fications for increased "flexibility" in juvenile trials, and conse-
quent relaxation of procedural safeguards therein, has always been
that youths were seen to be unusually susceptible to rehabilitation
through a sort of "remolding" of their character.8 5 This justifica-
tion can no longer logically be asserted when dealing with adults,
the class of persons to which juveniles were compared when the
"unusually" susceptible rationale was being formulated.
The characteristics of the 1800 proceeding meet up to the condi-
tions established in In re Winship, supra, for requiring, as a matter
of due process of law, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a pre-
condition to involuntary civil commitment. The person against
whom an 1800 proceeding is brought stands to lose two years of
juvenile court, the Court being,
reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek
in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of
the young .... [403 U.S. at 547];(3) the fact that no inherent unfairness is shown to exist in not employing
the jury in juvenile hearings; (4) the fact that a juvenile court judge is
always able to call for a jury, should he deem it advisable in any particular
case; (5) the fact that injection of a jury into the process would bring with
it unwanted delay; and finally (6) the fact that the argument that the lack
of a jury will create the,
.... likelihood of prejudgment ... ignores ... every aspect of
fairness, of concern, of sympathy and of paternal attention that thejuvenile court system [read: civil commitment process through-
out the United States!] contemplates. (403 U.S. at 550).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547-50 (1971).
84. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968), where the Court
quotes from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1943):
.. T)he power of the state to. control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults....
Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting
opinion).
85. State v. L.V., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 283, 263 A.2d 150, 154-55 (1970);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 552 (1971) (White, J., concurring
opinion); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967); Shone v. State, 237 A.2d 412,
415 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Maine 1968). Cf. M. Pirsig, The Constitutional Validity
of Confining Disruptive Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 MINN. L. REv.
101 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Pirsig).
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his liberty, with a potential commitment lasting his entire life. 6
The person subject to involuntary confinement in the 1800 commit-
ment is an adult, and is perhaps entitled to greater, but certainly
no lesser, safeguards against wrongful involuntary commitment
than is a juvenile. And the stigma of an involuntary commitment
under the 1800 proceeding is that which remains from the defending
party's original commitment under Juvenile Law. The 1800 pro-
ceeding affects only those persons already adjudged to be a "delin-
quent" and committed to the Youth Authority under the authority
of Sections 730, 731 or 777 and to young adults convicted of a crime
in an adult criminal proceeding and committed to .the Youth Au-
thority under the authority of Sections 1730-1731.5.8 7
The stigma on the coattails of the original commitment to the
Youth Authority is not magically brushed away upon petition to
the court for continued detention of the Youth Authority ward,
pursuant to Section 1800 et seq. Rather, that stigma is a continuing
stigma, and even a developing stigma as the duration of the in-
voluntary confinement extends itself and as the person commited
is isolated from a free, productive, healthy existence in a normal
social environment. The stigma, as it turns out, is the institution
itself, as it enravels its guests in an unnatural setting, with pres-
sures and problems unique to itself and alien to the outside world.
And of course, the treatment which the committed party to an 1800
proceeding receives is none other than that same treatment from
which he has come, the Youth Authority."8 The evidence is com-
86. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1802 (West 1972); see supra note 10 and
accompanying text. Note also, Justice Harlan considered the potential un-
just loss of liberty, due to factual error, to be the factor "of paramount im-
portance" as between this interest and the interest of avoiding a wrongfuljudgment eventuating in the stigmatizing of a youth. (In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 374 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring opinion).
87. Gary W., supra note 10, at 299-300, 486 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 4.
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1801 (West 1972). This is true unless
the Youth Authority fails to heed the implicit warning by the court against
use of the provision of § 1802 which purports to allow a transfer of custody
of any so committed person over 21 years of age to the Director of Correc-
tions "for placement in the appropriate institution." (CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 1802 (West 1972)). The court states:
(T)he Legislature has been at pains to assure that confinement
pursuant to Sections 1800-1803 shall be only for the purpose of
treatment. Thus, we need not decide whether confinement under
these sections, with the potential for confinement in state prison,
pelling-due process of law requires nothing less, in the 1800 pro-
ceeding, than that the defending party be involuntarily committed
only where a conviction exists, in the minds of the jurors, that the
defending party is of a character as alleged, beyond a reasonable
doubt!
CONCLUSION
Even a propensity to impassioned moods alone should not jus-
tify involuntary commitment: 'Many sane persons, under the in-
fluence of strong excitements, are subject to serious and perhaps
dangerous fits of passion; but another could not be allowed, on this
ground alone, to seize and imprison them, in anticipation that pos-
sibly the occasion for excitement might arise and the passion be
manifested.' (Van Densen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 129-130
(1879)).89
The involuntary commitment of a human being-whether called
"civil" or "criminal," "rehabilitative" or "penal"-is an action
which society must scrutinize with utmost care. At times the com-
mitment may appear justifiable, or even of the utmost necessity.
If the Legislature and the courts are truly concerned with only the
welfare of the involved individual, then the procedure most con-
sistent with due process would be to require an initial conviction,
under criminal proceeding procedures, for past overt acts and then
to allow a civil commitment for treatment for a maximum period
of that period prescribed by law for the offense (s) committed. The
1800 commitment involves proof of an unusually inflammable na-
ture and the character quality to be observed is not generally
susceptible of clear-cut medical analysis. The interests at stake are
comparable with or stronger than those of proceedings in which
strong procedural safeguards are required as a matter of due proc-
ess of law. Attention should be given by the courts to up-dating
the 1800 proceeding so as to provide a more specific and narrow
definition of the status in question, and to assure that an involun-
tary commitment rests upon no less than that standard of proof
for which due process of law cries out-beyond a reasonable doubt.
JACK FLEISCHLI
would be constitutionally permissible solely for the purpose of pro-
tecting society. [Gary W., supra note 10, at 301, 486 P. 2d at 1205,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 5).
89. G. Swan, A New Emancipation: Toward an End to Involuntary
Civil Commitments, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1334, 1353 (1973).
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APPENDIX
Pertinent Portions of Statutes Cited
from
California Welfare & Institutions Code
Section 601: Any person under the age of 18 years who persist-
ently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and
proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian, cus-
todian or school authorities, or who is beyond the control
of such person, or any person who is a habitual truant from
school within the meaning of any law of this state, or who
from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a ward
of the court.
Section 602: Any person who is under the age of 18 years when
he violates any law of this state or of the United States
or any ordinance of any city or county of this state de-
fining crime or who, after having been found by the ju-
venile court to be a person described by section 601, fails
to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court, is within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge
such person to be a ward of the court.
Section 730: When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on
the ground that he is a person described by Section 601,
the court may order any of the types of treatment referred
to in Section 727 (a section delineating appropriate disposi-
tions for individuals declared "dependent" children pursu-
ant to Section 600), and as an additional alternative, may
commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp or
forestry camp. If there is no county juvenile home, ranch,
camp or forestry camp within the county, the court may
commit the minor to the county juvenile hall.
When such ward is placed under the supervision of the
probation officer or committed to his care, custody and con-
trol, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for
the conduct of such ward... The court may impose and
require any and all reasonable conditions that it may de-
termine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be
done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward
enhanced.
Such ward may be committed to the Youth Authority
only upon a proceeding for the modification of an order of
the court conducted pursuant to the provisions of Section
777.
Section 731: When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on
the ground that he is a person described by Section 602,
the court may order any of the types of treatment referred
to in Sections 727 and 730, and as an additional alternative,
may commit the minor to the Youth Authority.
Section 777: An order changing or modifying a previous order by
removing a minor from the physical custody of a parent,
guardian, relative or friend and directing placement in a
foster home, or commitment to a private institution or com-
mitment to a county institution, or an order changing or
modifying a previous order by directing commitment to the
Youth Authority shall be made only after noticed hearing
upon a supplemental petition.
The supplemental petition shall be filed by the probation
officer in the original matter and shall contain a concise
statement of facts sufficient to support the conclusion that
the previous disposition has not been effective in the re-
habilitation or protection of the minor.
Section 1731.5: After certification to the Governor as provided in
this article a court may commit to the authority any person
convicted of a public offense who comes within subdivisions
(a), (b) and (c), or subdivisions (a), (b), and (d), below:
(a) Is found to be less than 21 years of age at the time
of apprehension.
(b) Is not sentenced to death, imprisonment for life,
imprisonment for 90 days or less, or the payment of a
fine...
(c) Is not granted probation.
(d) Was granted probation and probation is revoked and
terminated.
The Youth Authority shall accept a person committed to
it pursuant to this article if it believes that the person can
be materially benefitted by its reformatory and educational
discipline, and if it has adequate facilities to provide such
care.
Section 1800: Whenever the Youth Authority Board determines
that the discharge of a person from the control of the
Youth Authority at the time required by Section 1769, 1770,
1770.1, or 1771, as applicable, would be physically danger-
ous to the public, because of the person's mental or physi-
cal deficiency, disorder, or abnormality, the board, through
its chairman, shall make application to the committing
court for an order directing that the person remain subject
to the control of the authority beyond such time. . . . The
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application shall be accompanied by a written statement of
the facts upon which the board bases its opinion that dis-
charge from control of the Youth Authority at the time
stated would be physically dangerous to the public, but no
such application shall be dismissed nor shall an order be
denied merely because of technical defects in the applica-
tion.
Section 1801: If the board applies to the court for an order as
provided in Section 1800, the court shall notify the person
whose liberty is involved ... of the applicaton, and shall
afford process to compel attendance of witnesses and pro-
duction of evidence...
If after a full hearing the court is of the opinion that
discharge of the person would be physically dangerous to
the public because of his mental or physical deficiency, dis-
order, or abnormality the court shall order the Youth Au-
thority to continue the treatment of such person. If the
court is of the opinion that discharge of the person from
continued control of the authority would not be physically
dangerous to the public, the court shall order the person
to be discharged from control of the authority.
Section 1801.5: If the person is ordered returned to the Youth Au-
thority following a hearing by the court, he, or his parent
or guardian on his behalf, may, within 10 days after the
making of such order, file a written demand that the ques-
tion of whether he is physically dangerous to the public
be tried by a jury in the superior court of the county in
which he was committed. Thereupon, the court shall cause
a jury to be summoned and to be in attendance at a date
stated, not less than four days nor more than 30 days from
the date of the demand for a jury trial. The court shall
submit to the jury the question: Is the person physically
dangerous to the public because of his mental or physical
deficiency, disorder or abnormality? The court's previous
order entered pursuant to Section 1801 shall not be read
to the jury, nor alluded to in such trial. The trial shall
be had as provided by law for the trial of civil cases and
shall require a verdict by at least three-fourths of the jury.
Section 1802: When an order for continued detention is made as
provided in Section 1801, the control of the authority over
the person shall continue, subject to the provisions of this
chapter, but, unless the person is previously discharged as
provided in Section 1766, the authority shall, within two
years after the date of such order in the case of persons
committed by the juvenile court, or within five years after
the date of such order in the case of persons committed
after conviction in criminal proceedings, file a new applica-
tion for continued detention in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 1800 if continued detention is deemed
necessary. Such applications may be repeated at intervals
as often as in the opinion of the authority may be necessary
for the protection of the public, except that the authority
shall have power, in order to protect other persons in the
custody of the authority, to transfer the custody of any
person over 21 years of age to the Director of Corrections
for placement in the appropriate institution.
Every person shall be discharged from the control of the
authority at the termination of the period stated in this
section unless the board has filed a new application and
the court has made a new order for continued detention
as provided above in this section.
(Added by Stats.1963, c. 1693, p. 3323, § 4.)
Section 1803: An order of the committing court made pursuant
to this article is appealable by the person whose liberty
is involved in the same manner as a judgment in a criminal
case. The appellate court may affirm the order of the
lower court, or modify it, or reverse it and order the appel-
lant to be discharged. Pending appeal, the appellant shall
remain under the control of the authority.
(Added by Stats.1963, c. 1693, p. 3323, § 4.)
